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REVIVING THE CTBT DEBATE 
Should India sign? 
By ARVESD KUMAR THE Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation chief, Dr Wolfgang 
Hoffman, has made some state-
ments recently to revive the de-
bate among researchers 
worldwide on whether the CTBT 
will come into effect or not with-
out the signatures of India, Pakis-
tan and North Korea. 
The debate on the subject has 
also become important because 
one of the so-called threshold 
countries, Israel, is a signatory 
and has refrained from signing 
the nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. North Korea is a signatory 
to the NPT but has refused to sign 
the CTBT. 
On a global basis 
India's consistency in not sign-
ing the CTBT has been a major 
factor in the debate. It might be 
recalled that India's position is 
that it does not only want a ban 
on tests but nuclear disarmament 
on a global basis within a specific 
time framework. 
Meanwhile, the recent state-
ment by the Foreign Minister of 
Pakistan has shown a shift in its 
policy regarding the CTBT. Pakis-
tan was earlier of the opinion that 
its decision to sign the CTBT 
would depend on India's signat-
ure. Pakistan is now of the view 
that even if India signs the treaty, 
it will not owing to the existing 
disparities in the sizes of the arm-
ed forces of the two countries. 
However, it is still fairly likely 
that if India signs the proposed 
treaty, the nuclear weapon States 
will persuade Pakistan to comply. 
It should also be kept in mind 
that the nuclear weapon States in 
general, and the US in particular, 
will make all possible efforts to 
compel India to become a signa-
tory to the CTBT. Only a couple 
of years remain before the issue 
of whether the CTBT can enter 
into force or not or whether it will 
1*-B«piemented on a provisional 
basis has to be settled. Dr Hoffman 
has clearly indicated that interna-
tional pressure is being built up 
and will be brought to bear on In-
dia. 
Unlike the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, which is the 
world's nuclear technology moni-
toring organ, the CTBTO is a rela-
tively sophisticated global 
verification regime to monitor all 
future nuclear explosions. 
Following the Indian refusal to 
sign the CTBT endorsed by the 
United Nations General Assembly, 
the US and its allies are closely an-
ticipating the Indian response be-
cause the US perceives the CTBT 
to be a major aspect of its arms 
control objectives. The US has per-
suaded India and Pakistan to 
bring their nuclear and missile 
programmes in line with interna-
tional non-proliferation standards. 
In<Jia does not want to sign this 
treaty because it thinks that the 
CTBT is not a genuine attempt 
towards comprehensive nuclear 
disarmament. The nuclear weapon 
States will continue to have the 
freedom to upgrade their nuclear 
arsenals through simulation tests 
and computer operations in their 
laboratories. Yet the safeguards 
and monitoring/inspection re-
gimes do not fully cover the exist-
ing nuclear weapons capacities of 
the nuclear weapons powers. 
Security concerns 
The provisions of the CTBT im-
pose discriminatory restrictions 
on the power of non-nuclear 
weapon powers to develop their 
own technologies even for peaceful 
purposes. According to India's 
thinking on the CTBT, the nuclear 
weapon powers retain the option 
to resume their nuclear tests on 
the basis of their overriding secur-
ity concerns. Yet this option is not 
available to non-nuclear weapon 
States. 
Sanctions stipulated in the 
CTBT against countries violating 
its provisions are discriminatory, 
punitive and can be unilaterally 
imposed by the five nuclear 
weapon powers under pretended 
instrumentalities of the UN. The 
proposed CTBT does not in any 
manner provide for the complete 
elimination of nuclear weapons 
within any timeframe, short-term 
or long-term. 
Shared approach 
The negotiations on the CTBT at 
the Conference on Disarmament 
may have begun in 1994, but there 
have been many discussions on 
the subject over several decades. 
A shared approach is required to 
avoid incomplete results. The ab-
sence of such an approach at cru-
cial times prevented a successful 
outcome. The text of the CTBT 
agreement does not take into ac-
count or address any of the con-
cerns expressed by India mention-
ed above in the meetings of the CD 
on the CTBT from last year to the 
present date. It is a paradox that 
the signature of India is required 
to ratify it but its concerns were 
not even discussed or negotiated 
upon before the finalisation of the 
text which had been endorsed by 
the UN General Assembly. 
Given India's national security 
interests, it is clear that it cannot 
be a party to the CTBT in the form 
that it has been endorsed by the 
UNGA. The manifestos of all the 
major political parties in India 
have clearly articulated their op-
position to a discriminatory 
CTBT. India has to retain its nu-
clear capabilities for security as 
well as peaceful purposes and at 
the same time it should avoid be-
'ing isloated from the general or-
ientation of the international com-
munity towards a test ban. 
It bears recalling that a Non-
Aligned Movement-sponsored res-
olution at the UNGA has urged the 
nuclear weapon States to immedi-
ately stop the qualitative improve-
ment and stockpiling of nuclear 
warheads and delivery systems 
and called on them to undertake 
phased reductions with a view to 
their total elimination "within a 
timebound framework." This res-
olution garnered 110 votes in fa-
vour and 39 against (mostly the de-
veloped countries) and 20 absten-
tions. Most of the non-nuclear 
weapon States who are signatories 
to the CTBT have also expressed 
their concern for time-bound dis-
armament. 
Recently, the US was seen al-
most totally isolated in its opposi-
tion to the convening in 1999 of a-
UN Special Session devoted to dis-
armament. (The UN has convened 
such sessions in 1978, 1982 and 
1988). With the exception of a few 
countries, the entire UN member-
ship backed the non-aligned 
States' call for a fourth special 
session irt 1999, because they be-
lieve that there is a clear need for 
a new security and disarmament 
agenda as the world enters the 21st 
century. 
Now the question arises as to 
why India has been singled out for 
attention despite the fact that the 
proposal to link the CTBT to a 
time-bound global disarmament 
programme has already been 
made by the non-aligned nations 
party to the CTBT. 
Reiterated position 
India should therefore take note 
of its reiterated position. India 
should wait for the special session 
to be convened by the UN in 1999 
to put its case across. The point 
that has to be held up in the 
session among the non-aligned 
world is the questionable commit-
ment of the nuclear powers to dis-
armament. 
